V1: IoT Ecosystem Requirements
Last updated
Last updated
System security design performed prior to the development, and a security process which continuously supports system development and is integrated into all phases of its life-cycle, are necessary fundamentals for creating a secure product architecture and implementation.
A secure development process ensures the identification and documentation of all sensitive information and functionality which are needed for the system, enforces all the security controls on the appropriate level, and ensures that end-users and customers are notified about vulnerabilities and that security solutions are delivered on time.
The supply chain has vital importance for the security of the every project. A secure development process verifies that all security requirements for the suppliers and third-party code are implemented, so that their security controls are set with the appropriate security level, and no development-time features are left on the completed devices, exposing them to vulnerabilities.
To ensure the security of all software produced, the build process for the system software must be done in a secure build environment that verifies the integrity and authenticity of all components. The code must be written using best security practices and compiled using the best security options available.
For more information, see also:
OWASP MASVS: https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-masvs
OWASP Threat Modeling: https://owasp.org/www-community/Application_Threat_Modeling
OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model: https://owaspsamm.org/
OWASP Secure SDLC Cheat Sheet: https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets_excluded/Secure_SDLC_Cheat_Sheet.md
Microsoft SDL: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/
OWASP C-based Toolchain Hardening Cheat Sheet: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/C-Based_Toolchain_Hardening_Cheat_Sheet.html
OWASP Embedded Application Security: https://owasp.org/www-project-embedded-application-security/
#
Description
L1
L2
L3
1.1.1
Verify that all applications in the IoT ecosystem are developed with a level of security that is in line with the security criticality of the application.
✓
✓
✓
1.1.2
Verify that all components and communication channels in the IoT application's ecosystem have been identified and are known to be needed. Remove or disable any that aren't necessary.
✓
✓
✓
1.1.3
Verify the use of threat modeling as part of each product introduction design (i.e. new and mature) and security-relevant feature changes to identify likely threats and facilitate appropriate risk responses to guide security testing.
✓
✓
✓
1.1.4
Verify that the location where sensitive data is stored in the ecosystem is clearly identified and separated from unprivileged storage locations.
✓
✓
✓
1.1.5
Verify that security controls are enforced server-side and that data and instructions are not blindly trusted by server-side components.
✓
✓
✓
1.1.6
Verify that a responsible disclosure policy has been established and that it is easily found on the company website. Ensure that the policy provides a clear overview on how vulnerabilities can be communicated securely and how they'll be followed up on.
✓
✓
✓
1.1.7
Verify that users and relevant stakeholders are notified when vulnerabilities are identified through established communication channels (website, e-mail ...).
✓
✓
✓
#
Description
L1
L2
L3
1.2.1
Verify that each application (including firmware) in the ecosystem maintains a software bill of materials (SBOM) cataloging third-party components, versioning, and published vulnerabilities.
✓
✓
✓
1.2.2
Verify that potential areas of risk that come with the use of third-party and open-source software have been identified and that actions to mitigate such risks have been taken.
✓
✓
✓
1.2.3
Verify the device is released with firmware and configuration appropriate for a release build (as opposed to debug versions).
✓
✓
✓
1.2.4
Verify that access to debugging interfaces (e.g. JTAG, SWD) is disabled or protected before shipping the device. Processors may refer to this as code protection, read back protection, CodeGuard, or access port protection.
✓
✓
1.2.5
Verify debug capabilities in FPGAs are disabled.
✓
✓
1.2.6
Verify that devices are provisioned with a cryptographic root of trust that is hardware-based and immutable.
✓
✓
1.2.7
Verify that code integrity protection mechanisms are enabled and locked in hardware before shipping the device to customers. For example, ensure secure boot is enabled and the boot configuration locked.
✓
✓
1.2.8
Verify third-party code and components are analyzed using static analysis tools to ensure backdoors are not introduced.
✓
✓
1.2.9
Verify debug paths and traces are depopulated from production PCBs.
✓
#
Description
L1
L2
L3
1.3.1
Verify that each application in the ecosystem is built using a secure and repeatable build environment.
✓
✓
✓
1.3.2
Verify GPL based firmware has its source code published and that no sensitive or proprietary information is accidentally included in the process.
✓
✓
✓
1.3.3
Verify that use of banned C/C++ functions (i.e. memcpy, strcpy, etc.) are replaced with safe equivalents functions (e.g. Safe C).
✓
✓
1.3.4
Verify packages are downloaded and built from trusted sources.
✓
✓
✓
1.3.5
Verify build pipelines only perform builds of source code maintained in version control systems.
✓
✓
✓
1.3.6
Verify that compilers, version control clients, development utilities, and software development kits are analyzed and monitored for tampering, trojans, or malicious code
✓
✓
✓
1.3.7
Verify packages are compiled with Object Size Checking (OSC) (e.g. -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2).
✓
✓
1.3.8
Verify packages are compiled with No eXecute (NX) or Data Execution Protection (DEP) (e.g. -z,noexecstack).
✓
✓
1.3.9
Verify packages are compiled with Position Independent Executable (PIE) (e.g. -fPIE).
✓
✓
1.3.10
Verify packages are compiled with Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) (e.g. -fstack-protector-all).
✓
✓
1.3.11
Verify packages are compiled with read-only relocation (RELRO) (e.g. -Wl,-z,relro).
✓
✓
1.3.12
Verify release builds do not contain debug code or privileged diagnostic functionality.
✓
✓
✓
1.3.13
Verify that debug and release firmware images are signed using different keys.
✓
✓
1.3.14
Verify that debug information does not contain sensitive information, such as PII, credentials or cryptographic material.
✓
✓
✓
1.3.15
Verify that embedded applications are not susceptible to OS command injection by performing input validation and escaping of parameters within firmware code, shell command wrappers, and scripts.
✓
✓
✓